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Understanding European Foreign Policy Cooperation
1 
  In 1993, the European Communities transformed themselves into the European Union. A 
critical component of this transformation was the formal institutionalization of foreign policy 
cooperation. The previous system, known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), had been an 
informal arrangement of consultations by which the presidency made statements on behalf of the 
group and occasionally represented the group abroad through a ‘Troika’ arrangement with the 
former and next presidencies. The coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in November 
1993 created an institutional structure to support this cooperation, which it now dubbed the 
Union’s ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy,’ or CFSP. 
  The CFSP expanded on EPC in several ways. The legalization of the institution, chiefly 
through treaty provisions that legally committed member states to uphold and support CFSP 
decisions, was a major politico-philosophical change. The major functional change, though, was 
the creation of several new policy tools. EPC’s conclusions and press statements were joined by 
Common Positions and Joint Actions. These tools allowed the EU to move beyond simply 
stating its position. Common Positions created ways to coordinate activity in international 
organizations and conferences, and Joint Actions allowed the new Union to do something in 
support of its positions. Both tools improved on existing ad hoc and quasi-legal coordination and 
action under EPC by formalizing it and creating an institutional structure to support it. 
  After a decade and a half of CFSP, EU cooperation in foreign policy has expanded 
dramatically. The annual number of statements and declarations has risen sharply, and the 
number of Joint Actions and Common positions has increased as well though not to the same 
                                                 
1 This is a very early draft; please do not cite or quote without permission. More recent versions may be available on 
my website at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lpowner . Many thanks to Sarah Croco, Jim Morrow, Joel Simmons, 
Anca Turcu, and Jana von Stein for helpful comments and discussions in earlier renditions of these ideas. Claes de 
Vreese and panel attendees at the Midwest Political Science Association 2007 meeting also gave helpful feedback. 
All errors remain my own, and comments and suggestions are particularly welcome.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 3 
extent. On the surface, at least, CFSP appears to have been a success: more cooperation occurs 
each year. But has this expansion in cooperation kept pace with the expansion of world events? 
Has it kept pace with the expansion of the Union’s own stated interests? Has it expanded in 
scope and coverage? How much is CFSP activity a function of collective interests, and how 
much from the interests of the presidency or other major states? 
  This paper examines questions about CFSP activity by studying it in the context of a 
random sample of world events. It asks to what kinds of events or issues does the Union respond, 
and compares the results with the Union’s Treaty-established interests. The results are somewhat 
surprising: the EU is not particularly sensitive to events in neighboring regions, nor is it 
particularly responsive to abuses of human rights. Human rights issues are actually much less 
likely to attract Union attention than almost any other type of issue, though this trend appears to 
decline with time. The impact of the 1995 expansion dissipates rapidly, and contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, the new members’ historic neutrality does not appear to have affected 
cooperation in any way. Two important conclusions emerge: first, cooperation does not appear to 
have expanded with time in either scope of issues addressed or volume of events addressed. At 
best, the development of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy has kept pace with 
the growth of world interactions. Second, characteristics of the state holding the presidency are 
insignificant predictors of CFSP activity, suggesting at least moderate support for a norm of 
presidencies working for the general interest. 
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The Conventional Wisdom on CFSP 
  Much of the ‘conventional wisdom’ on CFSP emerges from the marriage of 
intergovernmental theory and case studies of particular events.
2 Intergovernmentalist theory 
emphasizes the importance of unanimity or consensus voting rules and the attendant right of each 
state, no matter its size, to veto.
3 Liberal intergovernmental theory, developed by Andrew 
Moravcsik (1998), adds a role for national power by privileging large states through their ability 
to afford and make side-payments and also through their ability to torpedo cooperation entirely 
by refusing to participate.   In the context of CFSP, large states are also more likely to possess 
critical capabilities that the EU requires for successful foreign policy cooperation: Security 
Council seats, military bases abroad, power projection capacities.  
  The more policy-oriented literatures of the early and mid-1990s emphasized practical 
obstacles to CFSP cooperation. In particular, they identified the existence of strong orientations 
for security and defense policy among current members as an obstruction. Ireland’s neutrality 
was particularly problematic; the preference of the UK and Denmark for security cooperation 
through NATO was countered by French (and for a while Spanish) nonparticipation in NATO 
military structures. By the middle of the decade, enlargement to three additional states with 
historic policies of neutrality threatened to impede cooperation on security matters even further. 
It is no accident that all three acceding states repeatedly made explicit declarations of their intent 
to participate fully in CFSP structures and policies, including security matters and the then-
“eventual” framing of a common defense policy.
4 In any case, policy orientation aside, achieving 
                                                 
2 The continued dominance in CFSP of intergovernmental decision-making processes reduces the value added of 
most (neo-) functionalist or similar arguments, though some analysts have described CFSP using multi-level 
governance frameworks. For example, see ME Smith (2004b); some of the contributions in Hill and M Smith (2005) 
also use this conception. 
3 Hoffmann (2000) 
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consensus among fifteen was almost certain to be more difficult than among twelve who shared a 
long history of cooperation, if only because of the added transaction costs of negotiating with 
three more states.     
  The crises in the Balkans proved to be important for CFSP’s development. By 
demonstrating so soon that the Union’s willingness to act exceeded its capabilities, particularly 
in the sphere of militarized security matters and humanitarian intervention, the Union funneled 
its policies towards an emphasis on peacebuilding and reconstruction. Military components of 
the debacle also demonstrated the Union’s limited capacity for power projection. The 
combination came to raise the importance of the Union’s ‘backyard’ or ‘neighborhood’ in its 
policy activity, particularly as the Union engaged in a long-term effort to administer and rebuild 
the city of Mostar. 
  As time went on, enlargement to the formerly Communist states of central and eastern 
Europe raised a new set of issues for CFSP cooperation.
5 In addition to being part of the EU’s 
‘neighborhood,’ the Union felt a responsibility to prepare the candidate states for accession both 
politically and economically. In particular, this meant the promotion of democracy, the rule of 
law, and the observance of human rights.
6 Civil and political rights, reform of the judiciary, free 
and fair elections, and treatment of cultural and linguistic minorities came to occupy a prominent 
place in the range of policy issues the EU emphasized in its dialogues with these states. These 
issues were enshrined in the Treaties as components of the Union’s external identity.
7 
 
                                                 
5 See in particular the work of K. E. Smith (1999, 2006: especially 276-84), which explicitly considers enlargement 
as foreign policy. 
6 The primary mechanism for this was the so-called ‘Copenhagen Criteria,’ which established political criteria for 
the opening of accession negotiations and accession. European Council (1993). 
7 Article J.1 of the Treaty on European Union establishes the “develop[ment] and consolid[ation of] democracy and 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” as one of the CFS’s objectives. See 
European Communities (1991: J.1.2).      Powner EUSA 2007 - 6 
Exploring Cooperation  
  The outcome of interest for this study is the EU’s cooperation on particular issues or 
events. In particular, I examine the EU’s adoption of declarations, statements, joint actions, and 
common positions through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the 1994 
Annual Report of the Activities of the European Union remarks that the CFSP coordination 
process “need not take place in the public domain,” it continues on to say that these processes 
may “lead to the issuing of a statement where issues of special political significance are noted.”
8 
This paper focuses entirely on the public output of CFSP for several reasons. First, and most 
importantly from a methodological standpoint, private behavior cannot be observed 
systematically. The only instances of CFSP cooperation which occur in private but for which 
public records exist would be a small set of either particularly salient or particularly non-salient 
issues, where the leaking of diplomatic contact has either deliberate political implications or no 
political implications at all. This is a nonrandom set of issues whose inclusion potentially skews 
the data. 
  From a substantive and theoretical standpoint, inclusion of only public behavior makes 
sense because only public behavior can credibly convey information, disclose preferences, or 
have a signaling or shaming effect. If the purpose of foreign policy is to affect the behavior of 
other states, then the actor must communicate to the target something about the actor’s 
preferences. These could be preferences for the upholding of particular international norms, for 
the taking or non-taking of particular actions, or for other behaviors. Both rationalists and 
constructivists deem communication to one state privately as a less effective method for 
conveying information and changing behavior, though for very different reasons. Rationalists see 
public communication as effective because it relies on the reputation of the sender, whereas for 
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constructivists the effect of public communication is felt through the reputation of the target. In 
any case, both believe that public communication is in most cases more likely to be effective 
than private. 
   
Methodological Concerns and Selection Bias 
  The methodology employed here is quantitative and large-n. This is a deliberate attempt 
to correct a rather important oversight in existing qualitative studies of CFSP cooperation, 
namely, the effect of selection bias. As Geddes (2003) demonstrated, the cases an analyst 
chooses can substantially affect his or her conclusions, and this is particularly true in small-n 
(qualitative) work. Causal inference in a small-n sample, where cases are selected on the basis of 
their value on the dependent variable, often results in two kinds of mistaken inferences about the 
nature of relationships in the data. First, it often “jump[s] to the conclusion that any characteristic 
the selected cases share is a cause” (Geddes 2003: 93). This is the logic of Mill’s method of 
causal inference; when multiple possible causal paths exist, findings become more an artifact of 
case selection than of the true causal process. 
  Second, and more importantly for this work, causal inference in small samples often 
assumes that unobserved cases, such as ones with other values of the dependent variable, have 
the same relationship between the dependent variable and the purported causal variable as the 
selected cases (Geddes 2003: 94). In Geddes’ example, the set of economically successful East 
Asian countries all have high levels of labor repression; the assumption then is that low levels of 
economic success, in East Asia and elsewhere, have low levels of labor repression. This 
assumption can lead analysts to conclude that success in East Asian states was a result of their 
level of labor repression. As Geddes convincingly demonstrates, though, when the full set of     Powner EUSA 2007 - 8 
developing countries, in East Asia and elsewhere, both successful and unsuccessful, is included 
in the study, labor repression has no relationship at all to economic growth rates. Unsuccessful 
states repress labor just as much as successful ones. 
  The implications of Geddes’ work for research on cooperation are profound. We cannot 
study only cases of cooperation: The population of declarations, statements, conclusions, joint 
actions, and common positions is still a very narrow and nonrandom portion of the population of 
possible cases of cooperation.  In the case of a consensus decision rule, any one state can block 
cooperation. This implies that the set of cases on which cooperation occurs is a highly biased set, 
one in which all (twelve) fifteen member states agree. Cases which are excluded from the sample 
are thus nonrandomly selected – success is perfectly correlated with the underlying variable of 
complete agreement – and this violates fundamental principles of inference. The result of 
selection on the dependent variable is that statistical results are biased towards finding no 
relationship even when one truly does exist.
9  
  Moreover, including only prominent examples or cases of failed or non-cooperation, as in 
studies of the 2003 Iraq War, does not eliminate the selection bias, though it can help to mitigate 
it slightly. If an analyst selected a set of publicly known unsuccessful cases to include in an 
analysis, this set would be biased as well: non-success would be correlated with an omitted 
variable of saliency or prominence. Norms of secrecy and confidentiality in CFSP (Smith 2004a) 
prevent the majority of disagreements from becoming public knowledge. Only cases with high 
political value would enter public discussion through leaks or other forms of journalistic 
investigation.
10  
                                                 
9 Geddes (2003:94) 
10 See Achen and Snidal (1989) for a well-known discussion of the pitfalls of prominent failures in the small-n 
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  Negative cases are important, then, for unbiased analysis. In cooperation, negative cases 
emerge from three separate processes. First, states could choose to discuss a topic but then be 
unable to reach agreement – this is failed cooperation. Collapsed negotiations leave a paper trail 
and public records in the form of media reports and diplomatic documents. This is the obvious 
route to identify and select negative cases, and in more transparent international processes such 
as negotiations to end civil wars, WTO negotiating rounds, etc., this is a valid approach. The 
analyst can identify the entire population of cases using these methods, and so analyze the 
population rather than a sample. 
  Negative cases can also occur, though, when the issue is never raised for discussion so 
that cooperation was never attempted. Two routes to this ‘non-cooperation’ exist. First, non-
cooperation could emerge because the issue is collectively deemed unworthy of (or inappropriate 
for) cooperation. The issue is not part of the institution’s remit, or it is insignificant or irrelevant 
to the members.  The second route involves a more insidious selection mechanism. States may 
know from previous events or relationships that one or more members would block cooperation, 
and so they consciously and strategically opted not to pursue cooperation.  This is a particularly 
important concern if failed cooperation carries substantial costs; the higher the potential costs of 
failure, the more risk-averse actors are likely to be.  
 
Selecting an Unbiased Sample of Events 
  Identifying an unbiased sample of cases for cooperation requires a solution that allows all 
cases, regardless of their values on the dependent variable, to have an equal probability of 
entering the dataset. Instances of both failed and non-cooperation must join successful 
cooperation in the sample. One solution is to identify the set of all international events or issues     Powner EUSA 2007 - 10 
on which states possibly could have cooperated. No such population census of issues and events 
exists. A close substitute, though, is Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, which is a global news 
digest. This monthly publication summarizes news and events from hundreds of sources around 
the world, using a consistent set of editorial criteria to guide selection and placement of items.
11 
It thoroughly covers inter-state relations; it also covers domestic politics in major states and 
prominent issues in domestic politics of small states (coups, constitutional revision, major 
protests or riots, natural disasters, elections, etc.).  
  To achieve an unbiased sample for analysis, methodologists generally recommend a 
random sample to ensure that selection criteria do not deliberately correlate with the dependent 
variable.
12 In this case, I applied a double-random method to Keesing’s. I randomly selected a 
stratified sample of pages from Keesing’s and coded these to identify qualifying international 
events and issues. Because of the nature of EU cooperation, instances of foreign economic 
cooperation or issues of economic policy were not coded.
13 Each page contained from 0 to 7 
qualifying international events, with the median page having 2. A random number generator then 
provided a way to select a single qualifying event from each page.  
  The final dataset spans the period 1994-2003, or the first full year of CFSP existence to 
the final year of the era of the Fifteen.
14 It contains 300 observations, or 37.68% of the 796 
                                                 
11 Personal communication, Keesing’s staff, 2 March 2006. 
12 Geddes (2003: 97. 
13 Issues of foreign economic cooperation (trade agreements, loans and grants from international financial 
institutions, etc.) are addressed in the EU through the Pillar I/EC processes and require cooperation between the 
Council and the Commission. My interest here is primarily on Pillar II/CFSP cooperation between states only.  
Other sets of non-qualifying events included state and official visits, military aid, and military equipment sales. 
Additional discussions of coding rules are in a more extensive appendix about event selection rules (see fn 1). 
14 The 2004 enlargement brings a host of methodological and practical problems. Methodologically, the 66% 
increase in the number of members creates a fundamentally different dynamic for decision-making. The substantial 
difference in histories and experiences between the new and old members also makes the pool a strongly non-
homogenous population, which complicates theorizing.  In practical terms, later work will require discussion of 
events in the sample with diplomats, whose reluctance to talk may be amplified by events or issues that are still of 
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qualifying events observed in the initial sample. The events in the final sample span the full 
range of geographic locations, issue areas, degrees of immediacy or urgency, and levels of 
salience.
15 This large random sample of events is, by the properties of random selection, a 
reasonable approximation of the full population of events and issues that states address in foreign 
policy. 
  The Bulletin of the European Union provided information on EU activity on each issue. 
In particular, it identified instances of statements, conclusions, joint actions and common 
positions – the four primary CFSP instruments of interest here.
16 The dependent variable for 
most analyses below is whether the EU adopts any of these four instruments for a given issue or 
event. Other analyses below use an ordered probit approach exploring total number of different 
instruments employed, and whether cooperation passed beyond the declaratory stage. 
  This coding of CFSP activity reflects a random sample of issues. It does not, and does not 
presume to, capture all CFSP activity. The EU does many things through CFSP which are not 
reflected here. In particular, internal institution-building is not captured in this coding, nor are 
most efforts to develop forward-looking proactive policies. Most ongoing or long-term activities, 
such as the reconstruction and administration of the city of Mostar, drop out of the study after a 
period, when they fail to continue to make headlines. A random sample of CFSP activity itself 
would certainly capture a better idea of the range of activity conducted with CFSP. The interest 
here, however, is not what the CFSP does substantively but when – in response to what sets of 
issues and antagonists – the CFSP is able to act at all. A random sample of events and CFSP 
                                                                                                                                                             
selected issues from each state for the entire study period. This poses a major challenge for the enlargement 
countries, many of whom do not have published records for that era in any widely-accessible language.  
15 Appendix 1 of this paper contains descriptive statistics about the data used here, including the dependent variable. 
A more extensive appendix describing event selection and coding procedures is available on my website (see fn 1). 
16 Common strategies are used only rarely and, during the period of this study, exist only in areas where much other 
activity occurs. As forward-looking framework documents, they are less of interest here than specific instances of 
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responses to events would not be expected to produce a representative picture of CFSP activity 
unless no strategic selection occurs, that is, unless all world events and issues have an equal 
probability of being addressed by CFSP.  
 
Hypothesizing About CFSP Cooperation 
  Two sets of factors affect the EU’s ability to cooperate: issue area and characteristics of 
the state holding the presidency. Because the presidency controls the agenda, formal activity is 
influenced by presidency characteristics; I return to this matter below. 
  First, issue area should matter. The presence of neutral states, initially including Ireland 
but then adding Austria, Finland and Sweden after the 1995 enlargement, should decrease the 
probability of acting on security and defense issues. This should be particularly true after the 
1995 enlargement, when a clear neutral caucus emerges.
17 
H1: Facing a security or defense issue should decrease the probability of 
cooperation. 
H2: The interaction between security and defense issues and the 1995 
enlargement should decrease the probability of cooperation. 
  The EU has also developed a set of issues that it identifies as its ‘external identity,’  
which are increasingly specified in each successive treaty. Cooperation on these issues is, in 
theory at least, a fundamental goal of CFSP. One of the most prominent components of this 
external identity as it has developed in practice is the promotion of human rights, including 
                                                 
17 The presence of Britain and Denmark, which are both generally Atlanticist in their foreign policy orientation and 
prefer to act on security and defense issues through NATO, would also decrease the likelihood of cooperation. But 
because this hypothesis depends on the presence of an alternative forum – NATO – as a substitute for the EU, I do 
not address it here. Later work tackles the substitutability of institutions in European foreign policy cooperation.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 13 
abolition of the death penalty.
18 The Union also sees itself as a major promoter of regional 
integration and other forms of international cooperation.
19 
H3: Human rights issues have an increased probability of cooperation.  
H4: The interaction of human rights issues and time increases the probability of 
cooperation. 
H5: Regional integration issues have an increased probability of cooperation. 
  Second, region should matter. Events in the EU’s ‘neighborhood’ of non-EU Europe and 
the former Soviet Union should draw more attention because of the risk of spillover from 
instability or other problems, and also from the possibility of enlargement. The latter concern is 
particularly relevant for human rights and democratization issues. 
H6: Compared to events elsewhere, geographically proximate issues (i.e., ones 
occurring in non-EU Europe or the former Soviet Union) should have an 
increased probability of cooperation. 
H7: The interaction of human rights or democratization issues with geographic 
proximity should increase the probability of cooperation. 
I evaluate these hypotheses using a dummy variable that indicates if an event is in the EU’s 
‘Neighborhood’ (i.e., central/eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union), and interact this with 
an additional dummy variable indicating human rights or democratization issues. 
  Third, enlargement should matter. This is captured in H2 above, in the effects of the new 
members’ particular security policy orientations, but it should also matter more generally. The 
transaction costs of achieving consensus among 15 are greater than for 12; this cost would persist 
after the members join and would not dissipate. Uncertainty about the new members’ true 
                                                 
18 Manners (2002). 
19 Treaty on European Union Article J.1.2, and its successor Article 11.1 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, identify the 
objectives of CFSP. See European Union (1991) and European Union (1997).     Powner EUSA 2007 - 14 
preferences and willingness to cooperate may also affect the Union’s overall propensity to 
cooperate, but the passage of time should ease this latter concern. I model enlargement in two 
ways: first, with a post-enlargement dummy variable which equals 1 for all events after 1 
January 1995, the date of formal accession to the Union, and second, with a variable whose value 
declines over time, from 1 in 1995 to 0.5 in 1996, 0.25 in 1997, 0 in 1998 and all years 
thereafter. 
H9: The 1995 enlargement should have a negative effect on cooperation in all 
future years by raising transaction costs. 
H8: The influence of the 1995 enlargement should diminish over time as states 
become re-socialized into the new institutional environment. 
  In addition to the mechanisms presented above, several other claims exist in the academic 
literature about CFSP cooperation. As suggested in H9, the first is a socialization argument. As 
states interact over longer periods of time, they become more familiar with each others’ positions 
and with the effects of the institutions in which they cooperate. State preferences may or may not 
shift, but familiarity with preferences and institutions increases state willingness to cooperate on 
a broader range of issues.
20 I model the effects of socialization here with a time trend variable 
                                                 
20 CITE! This mechanism seems to blur with a rationalist sense of Bayesian learning, in which states reduce their 
uncertainty by incorporating newly revealed information into their strategies for subsequent rounds. The current 
model is unable to distinguish between the two mechanisms; future work on preference formation may shed light on 
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measuring time since creation of the CFSP institutions.
21 I treat November and December of 
1993 as the “zero” year (excluded from the sample) and begin with 1994 = 1, 1995 = 2, etc.
22  
  H10: Socialization [time] should increase the probability of cooperation. 
 
Hypotheses About Presidency Influence 
  The identity of the state holding the presidency may influence CFSP output. As the data 
in Figure 1 indicate, presidencies vary substantially in their levels of foreign policy activity. As 
the primary agenda-setter in the Council, including CFSP and all other matters, the presidency 
allows states an opportunity to stamp their own priorities on the Union’s policy activity. For the 
period of the six-month presidency, the state’s leaders serve as the ‘face’ of the Union’s external 
policy, and agenda power allows states to pursue their own special interests.
23 For small states in 
particular, who lack the power to influence international events unilaterally, this provides an 
unusual opportunity for international exposure, visibility, and prestige.
24 
  H11: Union activity is more likely if a small state holds the presidency.
25 
                                                 
21 A time trend variable may also capture the effect of the development of a common identity among members. 
Identity development would presumably have begun during the EPC years, though it may have accelerated in the 
CFSP era. A model which spanned the formal creation of CFSP should produce a significant result on a time-trend 
variable if identity development and cohesion occurs, while also having a significant coefficient on a socialization 
time-trend variable which only begins with the creation of the formal institutions. Data limitations currently do not 
permit testing this claim. 
22 The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in January 1995 may complicate this issue. Efforts to investigate 
this question empirically are complicated by the accession only 14 months after the Treaty’s entry into force; I am 
unable to obtain sufficient variation to test directly. Alternate specifications of variables to capture socialization 
effects which account for this enlargement are not significant and do not affect the substantive results of the reported 
model. 
23 E.g., Edwards (2006: 55). 
24 Edwards (2006: 55-56).  
25 An alternative possibility is that small states, which lack the extensive bureaucracies of the larger states, may be 
politically willing but physically unable to coordinate as much activity and so we should expect a negative 
coefficient. (See, e.g., Edwards (2006).)The development of the Council secretariat over this time period, as well as 
the substantial experience of three of the four small states in holding the presidency, raise doubts about empirical 
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  On the other hand, large states have at least some minimal ability to influence world 
events; perhaps they see the Union as a set of resources to tap to enhance their influence. Large 
states are also more likely to have extensive trade relations with other states outside the Union, 
which may increase their interest in and attention to events abroad.
26  
  H12: Union activity is more likely if a large state holds the presidency. 
Large states are the ‘Big 5’: France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Small states are those 
with three or fewer council votes during the period: Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark, and Finland 
after enlargement.
27  
  ‘Great Powers’ are a separate category. States which hold permanent seats on the UN 
Security Council, which possess nuclear weapons and extensive sets of military installations 
abroad, and which have far-flung trade exposure may be particularly well-attuned to and active 
in foreign affairs. Their large foreign affairs bureaucracies can handle the demands of a 
presidency with the most ease, and would have sufficient capacity to process and manage 
extensive cooperation. The foreign military installations in particular, and seats on the Security 
Council, may make them particularly attuned to security issues. A separate dummy variable for 
Great Powers indicates France and the United Kingdom. 
  H13: Union activity is more likely if a Great Power holds the presidency.  
  H14: Union activity is more likely if a Great Power holds the presidency and the issue is 
  security-related. 
                                                 
26 Edwards (2006: 52) makes a counterclaim, that efforts by large states, who do possess the ability to influence 
international affairs unilaterally, has resulted in their reluctance to use the EU for cooperation and a continued 
preference for domaines réservés and bilateral relationships. 
27 Data drawn from Hix (1999: 70) and reflect voting weights used in the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) era. 
Substantively, a higher threshold may be desirable, but methodologically it is not possible. A higher threshold of 4 
votes makes this category too highly correlated with neutral presidencies to include both in the same model. A 
threshold of 5 votes eases the collinearity problem with neutral presidencies but then thirteen of the fifteen states are 
either “small” or “big.” The two variables are nearly a linear combination equal to 1 and so cannot be included in the 
same model.      Powner EUSA 2007 - 17 
  States with former colonial empires are also likely to retain substantial trade flows 
outside the Union and to have vested economic and political interests in their former colonies.  
  H15: Union activity is more likely if a former colonial state holds the presidency. 
A dummy variable indicates the seven EU states with colonial empires: France, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy.
28 Data limitations prohibit 
coding only for events in or affecting former colonies, so the colonial dummy takes the value of 
1 for any event during the presidency of a former colonial state. 
  On a related note, we might also expect that neutral states have less engagement with the 
world, particularly in security affairs, and so are less likely to be active in foreign policy. This 
would be particularly true for security issues, which they find sensitive.
29 
  H16: Union activity is less likely if a neutral state holds the presidency. 
H17: Union activity is less likely if a neutral state holds the presidency and the 
issue is security-related. 
  Finally, an additional factor to consider here is the norm of presidential neutrality. 
Holders of the presidency are expected to set aside, or at least not explicitly pursue, their national 
interests during their period of leadership, and they should work for the good of the Union.
30 The 
strength of this norm is debated; some scholars find evidence in support of such a norm, while 
others point to French behavior during the final negotiations on the Treaty of Nice as evidence 
                                                 
28 Alternative models excluding Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, which are substantially less colonial than the 
others, produce identical results. Spain lost its last colony (the Philippines) during the 1901 Spanish-American War; 
Italy came late to the colonial game but lost Ethiopia and Eritrea as part of the Second World War rather than 
through any actual decolonization process; and the Netherlands had only Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. 
The other four experienced significant shifts in their foreign policies in the postwar period as a result of 
decolonization, and this would affect foreign policy in ways that are not true for the three debatable cases. 
29 We might also expect states to be less active during their first experience with the presidency, which is often an 
overwhelming task; unfortunately this variable is too collinear with neutrality to permit its inclusion since three of 
the four neutrals (the enlargement states) are the only ones to experience a first presidency during the study period.  
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that if such a norm exists, it is weak and easily broken when clear national interests demand.
31 If 
this norm holds, we should see no or few significant coefficients on the presidency characteristic 
variables identified above. The influence of particular identities of presidency holders should not 
affect the probability of cooperation. 
 
Control Variables 
  Commission activity on an issue enters the models as a control. The Council delegated 
responsibility for humanitarian affairs to the Commission even prior to the formal start of CFSP. 
Commission activity in this case serves as a (full or partial) substitute for Council activity and 
should decrease the probability of the Council acting. In 1999-2000, the EU standardized its 
procedures and criteria for elections assistance and monitoring; the resulting policy was 
delegated to the Commission for administration.
32 I code Commission activity as humanitarian 
aid or aid for refugees/displaced persons for the country in question, or technical and project 
grants if they are explicitly related to the issue under consideration.
33 The latter characteristic 
captures most election assistance as well as some forms of ‘carrot’ aid given as incentives for 
desired behavior. For example, Guatemala’s major peace agreement of 1995 was followed 
immediately by a large series of Commission-funded projects for the reintegration of 
paramilitary units back into society, for the rebuilding of schools and infrastructure damaged by 
the war, and other similar items.
34 
 
                                                 
31 CITES. 
32 See COMM (2000) 191 975/EC, 976/EC [OJ L 120]; the Council’s adoption of election observer guidelines is 
noted  in Bull. 6-1999 1.3.2.  
33 All Commission activity is coded from the Bulletin of the European Union, cited in the standard format (Bull.). 
34 For the Guatemala example, see Bull. 10-1996 1.4.48; Bull 11-1998  1.4.115; Bull. 12-1996 1.4.42, 1.4.46, 1.4.96, 
1.4.97; Bull. 1/2-97 1.3.68.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 19 
The European Parliament in Foreign Affairs 
  In addition, I hypothesize that activity by the European Parliament (EP) may in some 
ways serve as a substitute for Council action in particularly sensitive human rights issues. The 
EP and its directly elected members have no formal authority to act in the EU’s external 
relations, and despite frequent calls from the Parliament for its greater involvement, CFSP and 
other external policymaking processes remain centered firmly in the Council. The EP is known 
for passing a large number of nonbinding foreign affairs resolutions every year. Often these are 
rather frivolous-sounding and of little effect, such as the ones condemning child labor in the 
production of sports equipment (specifically citing FIFA soccer balls used at World Cup matches 
in Germany),
35 on the situation of the elderly in developing countries,
36 and on the sexual abuse 
of women (with particular reference to Catholic nuns by priests).
37  
  Paradoxically, though, the EP’s main weakness in foreign affairs – its lack of ‘state’ or 
‘international actor’ status – may be its main source of strength. As a non-state actor, it is not 
bound by conventional rules of propriety in relations among states: noninterference in domestic 
affairs, implicit (or explicit) respect for powerful states, etc. Parliament regularly protests or 
denounces policies or events in the United States, China, and Russia, even when the Council has 
been uncharacteristically silent. The Council may see or acknowledge this kind of behavior as 
complementary to its own, and indeed may even encourage it.
38  At a minimum, with or without 
Council recognition, independent EP activity serves at least as a partial substitute for Council 
                                                 
35 Bull. 6-2002 1.2.1. 
36 Bull. 5-1994 1.3.92. 
37 Bull. 4-2001 1.2.1.  
38 Without conducting interviews, I am unable to identify to what extent the Council (tacitly or explicitly) 
encourages this behavior or accepts it as a partial substitute for its own actions. I plan to pursue this line of 
questioning in Brussels next winter.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 20 
behavior and should decrease the likelihood of CFSP cooperation on an issue.
39  EP activity is 
coded from the Bulletin’s reports. It must appear in the ‘The Union’s Role in the World’ chapter 
of the Bulletin. Resolutions must be own-initiative rather than a response to a Commission 
publication; they must also be about the substance of policy, not simply about inter-institutional 
prerogatives.  
H18: Action by the European Parliament should decrease the likelihood of 
cooperation. 
 
Cooperation Patterns in the EU 
  Evidence about overall cooperation in the EU’S CFSP is mixed.  If socialization 
arguments are correct, we should expect, overall, an increase in activity over the studied period 
as the states learn each other’s preferences and familiarize themselves with the workings of the 
institutions.  As a first cut at this issue, Figure 1 presents the average number of statements 
released in a month by each EU presidency since 1994. This represents only one type of 
cooperation that may occur, but provides a reasonably reliable measure of CFSP output initiated 
by each presidency.  Levels of cooperation vary here from a low of 7 statements a month from 
the Spanish presidency of late 1995, to a high of 19.8 statements a month by the Swedish 
presidency of early 2001.  These figures do show an upward trend, albeit a very slight one: on 
average, each successive presidency issues 0.38 statements more a month, or about 2 more 
statements a presidency, than its predecessor. Figure 2 plots the data against its regression line, 
with the 95% confidence interval showing the clear statistical significance of the coefficient. 
                                                 
39 Its additional habit of addressing thorny or politically awkward issues should also result in a lower probability of 
the Council addressing the issue. I am unable to separate the two mechanisms in the current dataset but may pursue 
the question in the future.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 21 
Alternate models suggest that the 1995 enlargement may have had a negative influence on 
cooperation levels, but the coefficient is insignificant.
40  
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 1 about here] 
  As an indicator of overall cooperation, the statement counts suggest that yes, CFSP is 
becoming more active and more productive over time. Data comparing CFSP activity to the 
broader sample of international events paints a different picture, though. Compared to the 
random sample of international events described above and in the appendix, CFSP activity has 
not increased substantially relative to the number of possible events or issues to which it could 
respond.  Figure 3 shows the proportion of events receiving cooperation for each year of the 
sample, where the Council adopting a statement, conclusion, joint action, or common position on 
the issue or event in question. The fitted regression line shows a positive but insignificant trend.  
Interestingly, post-regression analysis suggests that the most influential observation is 1995, 
which has a substantial and negative residual. Additional models controlling for post-
enlargement also failed to produce significant coefficients on either variable, though both signs 
are in the predicted directions.
41 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
40 All analysis is conducted in Stata 8.2. 
41 Disaggregation to presidencies, to parallel the first analysis, produces a negative effect; some presidencies 
cooperate on zero or one event in their period. In such a short overall period, though, when the dataset contains 
about 12-14 events for a typical presidency, this is probably more a function of the small sample size than of an 
actual decrease in CFSP activity. 300 events is a substantial number over a decade, but over 20 presidencies it 
produces a mean of 15 events per presidency.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 22 
Evaluating Hypotheses About Issue Characteristics 
  The hypotheses above group loosely into two categories: those related to characteristics 
of the issue (issue area, region of the world, time, and related interactions), and characteristics of 
the actors (presidencies and related interactions, action by other institutions).   
  I investigate these hypotheses using a probit model. The dependent variable captures 
whether any cooperation occurs within the Council on or in reaction to a specific event or issue 
from the Keesing’s sample. Any cooperation here refers to the issuing of a statement or 
conclusions (at any level), or the passage of a joint action or common position on the issue.  
 
The Core Model 
  Table 3 shows the results of a core probit model testing most of the hypotheses above. 
Model 1 in the first column is the primary focus of discussion; models 2-5 are robustness 
checks.
42 As is unsurprising in such preliminary work, evidence for the hypotheses is mixed. 
Enlargement and Time 
  The effects of the 1995 enlargement are complex. Enlargement was hypothesized to 
affect cooperation in several ways: through an increase in transactions costs caused by larger 
membership (H9), by making cooperation on security issues more difficulty (H2), and disrupting 
existing institutional patterns as the new members are socialized into the system (H8). A simple 
dummy indicating events which occurred after the enlargement (Enlargement in the table) is 
consistently insignificant and inconsistently signed, which generally leads to the rejection of H9. 
Despite support from Koremenos et al. (2001) and contributors there, adding more members by 
itself does not appear to impede cooperation notably in this case.  
                                                 
42 All predicted probabilities reported in this paper are generated using CLARIFY 2.0 and Model 1. See King et al. 
(2000) and Tomz et al. (2001).     Powner EUSA 2007 - 23 
  An alternate and somewhat more sophisticated understanding of the effects of 
enlargement is captured by the Enlargement2 variable. This variable takes the value of 1 in 1995 
and then decreases to 0.5 in 1996 and 0.25 in 1997.
43 While these values themselves are 
arbitrary, they reflect the idea that the effect of enlargement should decrease over time as the 
new members are socialized into the system and old members adapt to the new institutional 
dynamics. This variable performs much better, both in models testing it alone and in conjunction 
with the other complementary conception of enlargement. It is consistently significant and 
negatively signed. Table 4 shows the change in probability of any action being adopted across 
the years required to integrate the new members into the CFSP system. 
[Table 4 About Here] 
  This finding appears to provide considerable support for H8. Findings on the ‘time’ 
variable, however, seem to contradict or weaken this support. Time, as a counter variable 
indicating number of years of experience with CFSP, is correctly signed in only one model and 
does not ever approach statistical significance.  In most models, states are less likely to cooperate 
as time goes on, suggesting some sort of reverse socialization effect.  
  Interestingly, though, neither understanding of enlargement produces an effect on the 
likelihood of cooperation on security issues. Security issues themselves do not appear to be 
significantly less likely to obtain cooperation; the coefficient on security alone is always 
insignificant and inconsistently signed. Neither form of interaction term (Enlargement or 
Enlargement2) produces a significant effect in any reported model or in unreported robustness 
checks. Model 2’s p value is best, at around 0.475 – still well outside the bounds of conventional 
standards of statistical significance. H2 is thus also rejected by this set of tests.  
                                                 
43 This is equivalent to modeling a shock to the system which then decays. 1997 represents the last ‘transition year’ 
because the new member states were considered sufficiently integrated into the system by 1998 to begin holding the 
presidency in that year.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 24 
Additional Union Institutions and Activity 
  Action by the Commission has no direct effect on the probability of cooperation. This is 
generally expected, since the Commission activity variable captures a host of different kinds of 
actions including refugee aid, humanitarian aid, project aid, and more. Oddly, the variable is 
inconsistently signed but almost always marginally significant (p < 0.2). This is perplexing; 
hopefully further analysis, perhaps with disaggregated forms of Commission activity, will clarify 
this relationship.
44  
  Perhaps most surprisingly, the coefficient on EP action is always positive, always 
substantively large, and always highly significant, even across dozens of robustness checks. The 
EP’s foreign policy activity may seem frivolous at times, but by and large, the data suggest that 
action by the EP is strongly related to action by the Council. The dataset is unable to distinguish 
a causal effect – it includes EP actions both before and after any Council action – but the 
relationship is clear and unambiguous. If the EP acts on an issue, the probability of the Council 
acting as well increases by 41.5%, from 25.3% to 66.8%. The EP is acting on issues that are 
important enough to the Union for the Council to act on them as well – even if it does spend 
additional time on minor and trivial matters like the source of FIFA footballs. H18 is thus 
soundly rejected. 
Issue Area 
  As remarked above, the issue area of security is never statistically significant though it is 
in the predicted direction; H1 has no support here. Issues of democratization, including elections, 
constitutional revision, and installation of civilian governments, are likewise insignificant though 
                                                 
44 Commission activity may be insignificant because much related variance is being absorbed by the consistently-
significant Humanitarian issue area variable. The two are highly correlated; an interaction term for Commission 
activity on humanitarian issues was too collinear to include in the analysis. This is unfortunate as it would have 
begun to allow investigation of the inconsistent signing on the Commission variable. I am investigating alternatives.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 25 
it too is correctly signed.  Regional integration (H5), on contrast, is negatively signed (instead of 
the predicted positive) but insignificant.  
  Several issue areas do consistently produce significant coefficients. Humanitarian issues 
are correctly signed and statistically significant, suggesting a clear pattern of delegation to the 
Commission. Indeed, an interaction term indicating humanitarian issues with Commission 
activity was too collinear to include in any models.  
  Human rights issues, in contrast, are significant but in the opposite direction than 
predicted in H3. According to the base model, a human rights issue is 24.2% less likely to see 
cooperation than other issues. This effect is mitigated over time, though, as suggested by H4. 
The interaction of human rights issues and time is positive and significant, suggesting that, all 
else equal, a human rights issue in 2000 (the seventh year of CFSP existence) is 57.98% more 
likely to receive a response than one in 1996 (the third year of CFSP). 
  Unfortunately, though, the data provide no support for H7, on the effect of 
democratization and human rights issues in the EU’s ‘Neighborhood.’ Neither interaction term is 
significant; in the case of human rights, the sign is incorrect. Various robustness checks, 
including aggregating human rights and democratization issues into a single variable, and 
disaggregating the Neighborhood into its constituent regions, also fail to produce any significant 
results. The Union may talk a strong line on the importance of human rights observance and 
democratization in the then-candidate countries, but in practice, it does not appear to apply more 
emphasis to these issues than to others.  
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Alternative Conceptions of Cooperation: Ordered Models 
  The set of models presented above treats the dependent variable as dichotomous: did any 
form of cooperation occur, or not? Two alternative conceptions of the phenomenon of interest 
exist. The first examines the extent of cooperation: how many different instruments did the EU 
use? Unfortunately, no additional theory exists to help us understand when more is better or is 
more likely to occur. The only expectation, then, is that an ordered probit model using a count of 
number of different types of instruments adopted should produce stronger coefficients than the 
standard probit model. Exploiting the additional information of how many instrument types the 
EU uses should increase the efficiency of the model and allow for smaller standard errors. The 
highest number of instrument types adopted is three; a number of cases received both statements 
and declarations, but no case received both a common position and a joint action.
45 
  The second conception of the dependent variable involves a theoretically more 
sophisticated question about the adoption of “higher” or deeper forms of cooperation. Joint 
actions and common positions involve changing or initiating behavior; they are legally binding 
in ways that declarations or statements are not.  The combination of legally binding agreements 
and commitment of resources or actions means that cooperation carries costs, which increases its 
credibility, and/or that a state (or the Union) incurs specific reputational costs for backing down 
or defecting from the agreement. Invoking these costs (or at least their risks) moves the depth of 
cooperation beyond cost-free declarations and statements. 
  For this second ordered analysis, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a form of 
‘low’ cooperation occurred (statement or declaration); it takes the value of 2 if a joint action or 
common position occurred. The dependent variable’s value thus reflects the highest form of 
                                                 
45 Figure A1 in the appendix displays the frequency count for all values of this dependent variable.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 27 
cooperation adopted for that event or issue.
46 Data limitations, though, may complicate the 
analysis, since only twelve cases achieved any form of higher cooperation. All results from this 
model should be interpreted with that caveat in mind. 
[Table 5 About Here] 
  Table 5 shows the results of both types of probit model. Model 1 shows the analysis of 
total number of instrument types adopted, under the heading of ‘total activity.’ As before, time 
and a general post-enlargement indicator fail to register significant results. The model of 
enlargement as a shock to the system, though, again produces a significant result, albeit of 
weaker significance than the standard probit models of Table 4.  The European Parliament 
continues to produce a strong positive coefficient, though the coefficient on Commission activity 
falls substantially short of its previous significance values. In issue areas, humanitarian concerns 
still receive the predicted negative and significant coefficient; the interaction of human rights and 
time remains significant in the predicted direction though human rights in itself is insignificant. 
Security concerns, democratization, and regional integration remain insignificant. In an odd 
twist, though, the interaction of democratization and neighborhood (central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union) is significant while neither of its components are.  
  In short, though, beyond this odd result involving democratization (but not human rights) 
in nearby regions, this form of analysis appears to add no additional value to our understanding 
of CFSP cooperation. If anything, we appear to lose some traction on the question by analyzing 
                                                 
46 At least two alternative models for this data exist. The first is a polychotomous probit, where the categories of 
“declaration or statement” and “common position or joint action” are interpreted as simply different rather than 
ordered (i.e., the dependent variable is categorical rather than ordinal). Robustness checks using this type of model 
show no substantively different results than the ordered probit model presented here, though the theoretical 
understanding of the results of course differs. The second alternative model is a seemingly unrelated probit (SUP) 
approach, where the use of each instrument constitutes a model of its own but the models themselves are not 
independent and are linked through the error terms. This allows the instruments to be treated both as different from, 
and as complements or substitutes for, one another. The small number of joint action and common position cases in 
this dataset makes the SUP approach infeasible here.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 28 
the data in this form; the relatively small percentage of events obtaining any cooperation means 
that the same small amount of variance is now distributed over even more outcome categories.  
  The second conception of cooperation, analyzing the adoption of “higher” and “lower” 
forms of cooperation, also fails to add to our understanding of CFSP activity.  Patterns of 
significant coefficients and signs are similar to those of previous models. Overall, neither 
ordered model makes any substantial improvement in fit. This could in part be a result of the 
small number of cases obtaining the higher value; one should note though that in all the ordered 
models, the cutpoints for going from one instrument to two or more, or from low cooperation to 
high cooperation, are statistically significant. 
 
Evaluating Hypotheses About State Characteristics 
  Table 6 shows the results of probit models of any cooperation. Model 1 includes only 
presidency state characteristics, time/enlargement, and other EU institutions, while model 2 
introduces the issue area variables (and issue area interactions) from above. Model 3 is the 
complete model, including presidency characteristics, time/enlargement, issue area, and all 
relevant interaction terms; this model is the focus of the discussion below. 
  The results are rather damning. The single most prominent finding in the entire model is 
not a significant coefficient, but is instead the lack of significance on the coefficients of any 
presidency-related variable in any model.
47  The contribution of these variable’s to the model’s 
fit are moderate in absolute size but still fairly important in relative terms, though, so we cannot 
discount the importance of these factors in predicting behavior. The net result of the failure of all 
of these characteristics to predict is support, though the back door, for a reasonably strong and 
                                                 
47 This includes several robustness checks not reported here using other codings of colonial powers.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 29 
reasonably effective norm of presidency neutrality and defense of Union interests, at least in 
CFSP. 
  Of interest for further exploration, though, are the negative coefficients on both small-
state and ‘Big 5’ presidencies. The small state coefficient is the reverse of the one predicted 
above in H11, though the footnote does discuss that perhaps bureaucratic capacity is a factor 
here. The expansion of the Council secretariat during this time period for these purposes, though, 
and other developments in staffing and structure make this result somewhat puzzling, 
particularly in light of the negative sign on Big 5 presidencies. Big 5 presidencies were 
hypothesized to have the necessary resources, bureaucratic, political, diplomatic, and otherwise, 
to use CFSP frequently and effectively for either their own or the Union’s interests. The negative 
sign is puzzling here as well, though future analysis about the use of alternative institutions may 
help to shed light on this subject. 
 
Conclusions and Next Steps  
  The EU’s activity in CFSP generally shows only weak trends. Overall quantities of 
cooperation may have increased, but not significantly.  The range of issues addressed appears to 
have broadened in some respects and become more focused in others, as the interaction of human 
rights issues and time suggests.  Commission activity in humanitarian issues, and to some extent 
in general, acts as a substitute for Council action through the CFSP. In contrast, activity by the 
European Parliament is not a substitute for CFSP activity. Either the EP’s directly elected status 
gives its resolutions their own legitimacy, so that the Parliament has a weight of its own in 
international affairs, or the Parliament’s non-state status makes its resolutions meaningless and 
generally ignored by policymakers outside the EU.     Powner EUSA 2007 - 30 
  Most of the findings contradict expectations from the conventional wisdom, and most are 
substantively significant in their statistical nonsignificance. Contrary to expectations, events and 
issues in the EU’s ‘Neighborhood’ do not receive more attention, even when those events/issues 
are related to the EU’s core concerns of democratization and human rights. The 1995 
enlargement to three neutral states decreased the probability of cooperation on any issue for 
several years, but security issues did not appear to be affected more than any other type of issue.  
  The model, however, is not complete. As noted above, Commission activity as coded 
here includes a range of actions; separating these to understand the influence of the 
Commission’s actions is a critical component of the research. In addition, issues/events of 
conflict resolution processes or attempts should be coded as an issue area, and coding for 
colonial masters is blanket rather than specific to former colonies; data limitations currently 
prohibit both types of analysis, and these need rectified. How does issue salience matter? Is the 
model predicting behavior poorly because most of the sample’s events are of low or moderate 
salience?  Finally, extensions of this work will consider how much the presence of other 
potential institutional venues for cooperation affects the extent of cooperation in the EU. 
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Figure 1. Average Number of Statements Per Month, By Presidency 
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Figure 2. Average Statements Over Time. 
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Figure 3. EU Cooperation Over Time. 
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Table 1. Statements Per Presidency. 
OLS Regression: 
Average Number of 
Statements per Month, 
by Presidency  Model 1  Model 2 
Time (presidency)  0.3834*** 
(0.964) 
0.4045** 
(0.1159) 
Post-enlargement    -0.7786 
(2.2268) 
Constant  8.1636*** 
(1.156) 
8.6431*** 
(1.812) 
n  20  20 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01  ** p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Share of Events with Cooperation. 
OLS Regression: 
Percentage of Events 
With Cooperation  Model 1  Model 2 
Time (years since 
CFSP creation) 
0.3642 
(0.826) 
0.3967 
(1.035) 
Post-enlargement    - 0.5944 
(9.096) 
Constant  25.146*** 
(5.123) 
25.503** 
(8.081) 
n  10  10 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01  ** p<0.05 
 
 
 
     Powner EUSA 2007 - 34 
 
Table 3. Probit Analysis of Any Cooperation. 
Probit: Any 
Cooperation 
(1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
Time  -0.075 
(0.556) 
0.020 
(0.026) 
-0.766 
(0.55) 
-0.025 
(0.037)  
Enlargement  0.279 
(0.542) 
-0.329 
(0.457) 
0.581 
(0.461) 
 
Enlargement2  -1.078** 
(0.476) 
   -1.095** 
(0.530) 
-0.726 
(0.434)* 
Neighborhood  0.080 
(0.228) 
0.118 
(0.195) 
0.108 
(0.198) 
0.125 
(0.196)  
Commission  -0.370* 
(0.221) 
0.3516 
(0.218)  
-0.362 
(0.221) 
0.324 
(0.218)  
European 
Parliament 
1.121*** 
(0.250) 
1.042*** 
(0.242) 
1.105*** 
(0.250) 
1.101*** 
(0.248) 
Human Rights  -3.017* 
(2.071) 
-1.671* 
(0.918) 
-2.060* 
(1.087) 
-1.831* 
(0.988) 
Democratization  0.089 
(0.324) 
0.184 
(0.269) 
0.245 
(0.278) 
0.245 
(0.276) 
Regional 
Integration 
-0.566 
(0.589) 
-0.554 
(0.595) 
-0.512 
(0.570) 
-0.521 
(0.585) 
Security  -0.451 
(0.569) 
-0.393 
(0.565) 
0.026 
(0.220) 
-0.014 
(0.327) 
Humanitarian  -1.083* 
(0.596) 
-1.166** 
(0.591) 
-1.062* 
(0.602) 
-1.088* 
(0.602) 
Security * Enlg  0.536 
(0.593) 
0.489 
(0.587) 
   
Security * Enlg2      0.40 
(0.622) 
0.072 
(0.615) 
Hum Rts * Time  0.332** 
(0.134) 
0.272** 
(0.117) 
0.325** 
(0.137) 
0.291** 
(0.124) 
Democratization * 
Neighborhood 
0.509 
(0.568) 
     
Hum Rts * 
Neighborhood 
-0.314 
(0.678) 
     
Constant    -0.632 
(0.428)  
0.078** 
(0.334) 
-0.591** 
(0.293) 
N  300  300  300  300 
Log Likelihood  -153.985  -157.430  -154.930  -155.735 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01   ** p<0.05  * p<0.1 
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Table 4. The Effect of Enlargement on the Probability of Cooperation 
 
 
Year  Enlargement  Enlargement2  Time  Pr(cooperation) 
1994  0  0  1  29.53% 
1995  1  1  2    8.58% 
1996  1  0.5  3  16.79% 
1997  1  0.25  4  21.82% 
1998  1  0  5  27.82% 
1999  1  0  6  25.30% 
 
 
Predicted probabilities generated in Stata 8.2 using the Clarify 2.0 routine. All variables are held 
at their medians (0) unless reported here. 
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Table 5. Ordered Probit Models. 
 
Ordered Probit  Total Activity  “Highest” Activity  “Highest” Activity (2) 
Time  -0.061 
(0.053) 
-0.078 
(0.054) 
-0.080   
(0.054) 
Enlargement  0.213  
(0.524) 
0.065 
(0.519) 
0.182 
(0.502) 
Enlargement2  -0.871* 
(0.446) 
-0.654 
(0.432) 
-0.770* 
(0.427) 
Neighborhood  0.083   
(0.216) 
0.153 
(0.216) 
0.174 
(0.212) 
Commission  0.302  
(0.207) 
0.427**  
(0.206) 
0.369* 
(0.199) 
European Parliament  1.174*** 
(0.222) 
1.121*** 
(0.228) 
1.080*** 
(0.222) 
Human Rights  -1.773 
(1.004) 
-1.828* 
(0.977) 
-1.717* 
(0.994) 
Democratization  0.068 
(0.311) 
0.076 
(0.306) 
0.189 
(0.303) 
Regional Integration  -0.567 
(0.584) 
-0.777 
(0.586) 
-0.649 
(0.581) 
Security  -0.226 
(0.543) 
-0.166 
(0.525) 
0.035 
(0.508) 
Humanitarian  -1.140* 
(0.599) 
-8.966 
(2.31e+07) 
 
Security * Enlg  0.284 
(0.564) 
0.078 
(0.549) 
-0.013 
(0.534) 
Hum Rts * Time  0.275** 
(0.123) 
0.285** 
(0.122) 
0.281* 
(0.124) 
Democratization * 
Neighborhood 
0.853* 
(0.512) 
0.838 
(0.515) 
(p<0.104) 
0.798 
(0.513) 
Hum Rts * Neighborhood  -0.208 
(0.638) 
-0.770 
(0.712) 
-0.792 
(0.711) 
Cut 1  0.547 
(0.425) 
0.266 
(0.412) 
0.436 
(0.386) 
Cut 2  1.843 
(0.444) 
1.738 
(0.436) 
1.875 
(0.412) 
Cut 3  2.522 
(0.483) 
   
N  300  300  300 
Log Likelihood  -195.835  -184.359  -190.349 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01   ** p<0.05  * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Evaluating Hypotheses About State Characteristics 
Probit: Any Cooperation  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Time  -0.041 
(0.058) 
-0.073 
(0.062) 
-0.084   
(0.063)   
Enlargement  0.668 
(0.560) 
0.316 
(0.652) 
0.359 
(0.662) 
Enlargement2  -0.088* 
(0.464) 
-1.045** 
(0.499) 
-1.158** 
(0.537)  
Commission  0.277 
(0.209) 
0.373* 
(0.223) 
0.366 
(0.224)  
European Parliament  1.128*** 
(0.245) 
1.124*** 
(0.254) 
1.100*** 
(0.256) 
Small Presidency  -0.188 
(0.286) 
-0.080 
(0.298) 
-0.065 
(0.299) 
Big 5 Presidency  -0.171 
(0.241) 
-0.076 
(0.252) 
-0.082 
(0.254) 
Great Power Presidency  0.097 
(0.277) 
0.095 
(0.289) 
0.0284 
(0.356) 
Colonial Presidency  -0.104 
(0.234) 
-0.033 
(0.243) 
-0.011 
(0.244) 
Neutral Presidency  -0.118 
(0.245) 
0.0003 
(0.254) 
0.096 
(0.275)     
Neighborhood    0.080 
(0.231) 
0.085 
(0.232) 
Human Rights    -2.013* 
(1.081) 
-2.068* 
(1.108) 
Democratization    0.100 
(0.329) 
0.107 
(0.329) 
Regional Integration    -0.547 
(0.592) 
-0.560 
(0.594) 
Security    -0.446 
(0.570) 
-0.440 
(0.570) 
Humanitarian    -1.075* 
(0.600) 
-1.069* 
(0.596) 
Security * Enlargement    0.5379 
(0.594) 
0.620 
(0.620) 
Hum Rights * Time    0.329** 
(0.136) 
0.338** 
(0.139) 
Democratization * 
Neighborhood 
  0.511 
(0.570) 
0.498 
(0.571) 
Human Rights * 
Neighborhood 
  -0.295 
(0.684) 
-0.284 
(0.687) 
Neutral Presidency * 
Security 
    -0.524 
(0.510) 
Great Power Presidency * 
Security 
    0.164 
(0.558) 
Constant  -0.877 
(0.289) 
-0.513 
(0.435) 
-0.498 
(0.436) 
N  300  300  300 
Log Likelihood  -162.4876  -153.88453  -153.17154 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01   ** p<0.05  * p<0.1     Powner EUSA 2007 - 38 
Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The Cases 
Cases are drawn from 1994-2003, by the double random sample method described in the paper 
and presented in further detail at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lpowner/.  
 
Table A1. 
 
Year  
Number of 
Cases 
 
Percent 
1994  27  9.00 
1995  30  10.00 
1996  28  9.33 
1997  28  9.33 
1998  31  10.33 
1999  30  10.00 
2000  25  8.33 
2001  33  11.00 
2002  31  10.33 
2003  37  12.33 
Total  300  100% 
 
2003 appears to be a bit over-represented, and 2000 a bit under-represented; in robustness checks 
and other tests not reported here, though, neither year appears to exert any exceptional influence 
on the findings.  
 
The Issues 
Issues are coded initially into 21 categories, which are then grouped as relevant for further 
analysis. The finer-grained codings will be used for future analysis. 
 
Table A2. 
 
Issue 
Number of 
Cases 
 
Percent 
Human Rights  29    9.67 
Security  83  27.67 
Humanitarian Crises  15    5.00 
Democratization  34  11.33 
Regional Integration  9    3.00 
All Others  130  43.33 
 
The category of security includes all cases of inter-state and intra-state conflict, states of 
heightened security-based tension (e.g., Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Straits in early 
1995 which nearly led to war, Venezuela-Colombia tensions in 2003 after alleged border 
violations), and international military intervention. In this rendition, it does not include cases of 
conflict resolution or attempts at conflict resolution as this complicates interpretation of the 
coefficients. Democratization issues include elections, issues identified as advances in 
democratization (e.g., the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Afghanistan in 
2002, constitutional reform in the Dominican Republic in 2002, indigenous rights legislation in 
Mexico in 2001), and issues identified as retrenchment of democracy (e.g., the Argentine     Powner EUSA 2007 - 39 
legislature’s attempt to impeach an independent Supreme Court for exercising that independence 
in 2002, Tajikistan’s banning of religious political parties in 1998). Humanitarian crises include 
refugee issues, natural disasters including famines, earthquakes, and hurricanes/cyclones, and 
manmade disasters including major air and sea disasters and environmental catastrophes. 
 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used here captures whether any form of CFSP cooperation occurs on an 
issue. This includes the issuing of a Presidency or European Union statement, the issuing of a 
conclusion from a Council meeting (including the European Council), or the adoption of a joint 
action or common position (including decisions extending or modifying an existing joint action 
or common position on a relevant topic). For reference, the Commission’s and EP’s activity is 
shown here as well. 
 
Table A3. Distribution of Acts 
 
Act 
Number of 
Cases 
 
Percent 
Statement  58  19.33 
Conclusion  31  10.33 
Joint Action    5    1.67 
Common Position    7    2.33 
Commission  55  18.33 
European Parliament  36  12.00 
 
Figure A1. Number of Acts per Case 
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The 101 instances of CFSP cooperation observed in the dataset cover 83 observations: Some 
observations (events or issues) receive multiple forms of cooperation. As Figure A1 above 
indicates, four cases (1.333%) had a statement, a conclusion, and either a joint action or common 
position adopted. No case received all four forms. Seven cases (3.333%) had two forms of 
cooperation, usually a statement and a conclusion, and the remaining cases received one type of 
cooperation (virtually always a statement or a conclusion).      Powner EUSA 2007 - 40 
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